diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
index 64f82263b20e4dc5b3e97258db8524a6c494d9e6..a62f228be6da10049dd25f23d7999c7ce097b4ae 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM
depends on FSL_SOC || ARCH_MXC || ARCH_LAYERSCAPE
select SOC_BUS
select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_COMMON
+ imply FSL_MC_BUS
help
Enables the driver module for Freescale's Cryptographic Accelerator
and Assurance Module (CAAM), also known as the SEC version 4 (SEC4).
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
index d0027d31e840bf4f94ab501e724ab7642cabcf8c..988bfddbadc644a13c05654926c3abb574d7e331 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ static u32 *caam_init_desc(u32 *desc, dma_addr_t dst_dma, int len)
{
init_job_desc(desc, 0); /* + 1 cmd_sz */
/* Generate random bytes: + 1 cmd_sz */
- append_operation(desc, OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG);
+ append_operation(desc, OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG |
+ OP_ALG_PR_ON);
/* Store bytes: + 1 cmd_sz + caam_ptr_sz */
append_fifo_store(desc, dst_dma, len, FIFOST_TYPE_RNGSTORE);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index b278471f4013b205fd49ddef0d1de18c55b04406..4fcdd262e5812c44418f751a500ae3abeb93d076 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/of_address.h>
#include <linux/of_irq.h>
#include <linux/sys_soc.h>
+#include <linux/fsl/mc.h>
#include "compat.h"
#include "regs.h"
@@ -36,7 +37,8 @@ static void build_instantiation_desc(u32 *desc, int handle, int do_sk)
init_job_desc(desc, 0);
op_flags = OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG | OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG |
- (handle << OP_ALG_AAI_SHIFT) | OP_ALG_AS_INIT;
+ (handle << OP_ALG_AAI_SHIFT) | OP_ALG_AS_INIT |
+ OP_ALG_PR_ON;
/* INIT RNG in non-test mode */
append_operation(desc, op_flags);
@@ -278,12 +280,25 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
return -ENOMEM;
for (sh_idx = 0; sh_idx < RNG4_MAX_HANDLES; sh_idx++) {
+ const u32 rdsta_if = RDSTA_IF0 << sh_idx;
+ const u32 rdsta_pr = RDSTA_PR0 << sh_idx;
+ const u32 rdsta_mask = rdsta_if | rdsta_pr;
/*
* If the corresponding bit is set, this state handle
* was initialized by somebody else, so it's left alone.
*/
- if ((1 << sh_idx) & state_handle_mask)
- continue;
+ if (rdsta_if & state_handle_mask) {
+ if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask)
+ continue;
+
+ dev_info(ctrldev,
+ "RNG4 SH%d was previously instantiated without prediction resistance. Tearing it down\n",
+ sh_idx);
+
+ ret = deinstantiate_rng(ctrldev, rdsta_if);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
/* Create the descriptor for instantiating RNG State Handle */
build_instantiation_desc(desc, sh_idx, gen_sk);
@@ -303,9 +318,9 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
if (ret)
break;
- rdsta_val = rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_IFMASK;
+ rdsta_val = rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_MASK;
if ((status && status != JRSTA_SSRC_JUMP_HALT_CC) ||
- !(rdsta_val & (1 << sh_idx))) {
+ (rdsta_val & rdsta_mask) != rdsta_mask) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
@@ -564,6 +579,26 @@ static void caam_remove_debugfs(void *root)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_FSL_MC_BUS
+static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version, u32 major,
+ u32 minor, u32 revision)
+{
+ if (mc_version->major > major)
+ return true;
+
+ if (mc_version->major == major) {
+ if (mc_version->minor > minor)
+ return true;
+
+ if (mc_version->minor == minor &&
+ mc_version->revision > revision)
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
/* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
@@ -582,6 +617,7 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
u8 rng_vid;
int pg_size;
int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
+ bool pr_support = false;
ctrlpriv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrlpriv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctrlpriv)
@@ -667,6 +703,21 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
/* Get the IRQ of the controller (for security violations only) */
ctrlpriv->secvio_irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(nprop, 0);
+ np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,qoriq-mc");
+ ctrlpriv->mc_en = !!np;
+ of_node_put(np);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FSL_MC_BUS
+ if (ctrlpriv->mc_en) {
+ struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version;
+
+ mc_version = fsl_mc_get_version();
+ if (mc_version)
+ pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20, 0);
+ else
+ return -EPROBE_DEFER;
+ }
+#endif
/*
* Enable DECO watchdogs and, if this is a PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT kernel,
@@ -674,10 +725,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
* In case of SoCs with Management Complex, MC f/w performs
* the configuration.
*/
- np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,qoriq-mc");
- ctrlpriv->mc_en = !!np;
- of_node_put(np);
-
if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en)
clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->mcr, MCFGR_AWCACHE_MASK,
MCFGR_AWCACHE_CACH | MCFGR_AWCACHE_BUFF |
@@ -784,7 +831,7 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
* already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
* In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
*/
- if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en && rng_vid >= 4) {
+ if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
/*
@@ -794,11 +841,11 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
* to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
*/
gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
- ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_IFMASK;
+ ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
do {
int inst_handles =
rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
- RDSTA_IFMASK;
+ RDSTA_MASK;
/*
* If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
* (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
@@ -838,7 +885,7 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
* Set handles init'ed by this module as the complement of the
* already initialized ones
*/
- ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_IFMASK;
+ ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
index 4b6854bf896a74f0755dc32a697ef8f8ebee9916..e796d3cb9be8773963a21646d6e99e825bf7486c 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
@@ -1254,6 +1254,8 @@
#define OP_ALG_ICV_OFF (0 << OP_ALG_ICV_SHIFT)
#define OP_ALG_ICV_ON (1 << OP_ALG_ICV_SHIFT)
+#define OP_ALG_PR_ON BIT(1)
+
#define OP_ALG_DIR_SHIFT 0
#define OP_ALG_DIR_MASK 1
#define OP_ALG_DECRYPT 0
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
index c191e8fd0fa76ce513c6dbb9b2bc7154f1554486..0f810bc13b2bd525578f1180ddb24ca7f3aa3291 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
@@ -524,9 +524,11 @@ struct rng4tst {
u32 rsvd1[40];
#define RDSTA_SKVT 0x80000000
#define RDSTA_SKVN 0x40000000
+#define RDSTA_PR0 BIT(4)
+#define RDSTA_PR1 BIT(5)
#define RDSTA_IF0 0x00000001
#define RDSTA_IF1 0x00000002
-#define RDSTA_IFMASK (RDSTA_IF1 | RDSTA_IF0)
+#define RDSTA_MASK (RDSTA_PR1 | RDSTA_PR0 | RDSTA_IF1 | RDSTA_IF0)
u32 rdsta;
u32 rsvd2[15];
};