diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
index ca622c9aa24c87aa0637782000d9e11a19e17086..9578247e17929bf4fcd6bd50b185f955031dc96d 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
@@ -7,17 +7,37 @@ Description:
HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the
value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
- EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it
- with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation.
- The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until
- EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully
- loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM
- can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but
- returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM
- should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done
- in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part
- of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and
- loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
- Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. (A sample
- dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables
- EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)
+ EVM supports two classes of security.evm. The first is
+ an HMAC-sha1 generated locally with a
+ trusted/encrypted key stored in the Kernel Key
+ Retention System. The second is a digital signature
+ generated either locally or remotely using an
+ asymmetric key. These keys are loaded onto root's
+ keyring using keyctl, and EVM is then enabled by
+ echoing a value to <securityfs>/evm:
+
+ 1: enable HMAC validation and creation
+ 2: enable digital signature validation
+ 3: enable HMAC and digital signature validation and HMAC
+ creation
+
+ Further writes will be blocked if HMAC support is enabled or
+ if bit 32 is set:
+
+ echo 0x80000002 ><securityfs>/evm
+
+ will enable digital signature validation and block
+ further writes to <securityfs>/evm.
+
+ Until this is done, EVM can not create or validate the
+ 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
+ Loading keys and signaling EVM should be done as early
+ as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs,
+ which has already been measured as part of the trusted
+ boot. For more information on creating and loading
+ existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
+
+ Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both dracut
+ (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via
+ core/ima-setup) have support for loading keys at boot
+ time.
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 61517f57f8ef744e9915c33659cfba96c0a1f767..49e1f2f1a4cbefe0906224433d03ee5c36e7a9c1 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -201,11 +201,11 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
eventpoll_release(file);
locks_remove_file(file);
+ ima_file_free(file);
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) {
if (file->f_op->fasync)
file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
}
- ima_file_free(file);
if (file->f_op->release)
file->f_op->release(inode, file);
security_file_free(file);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 885266aae2d7d57615db4125884abb813066590f..e1f75a3b4af5be684d694a3c10439ed12ff69c26 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2793,6 +2793,7 @@ extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \
id(KEXEC_INITRAMFS, kexec-initramfs) \
id(POLICY, security-policy) \
+ id(X509_CERTIFICATE, x509-certificate) \
id(MAX_ID, )
#define __fid_enumify(ENUM, dummy) READING_ ## ENUM,
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index fe5aa3736707294a5a4b6f20ea83be79d91dc9c0..c69b49abe8775417587387a8d7def5497e476fc8 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -639,6 +639,8 @@ static inline bool is_livepatch_module(struct module *mod)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */
+bool is_module_sig_enforced(void);
+
#else /* !CONFIG_MODULES... */
static inline struct module *__module_address(unsigned long addr)
@@ -753,6 +755,11 @@ static inline bool module_requested_async_probing(struct module *module)
return false;
}
+static inline bool is_module_sig_enforced(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h b/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h
index a92be0f492a9bef04caf3bcc4108bb134c015474..c1395b5bd432a0e4fe9275b8d4eece00a52999c2 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_MMAP
+#define XATTR_APPARMOR_SUFFIX "apparmor"
+#define XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_APPARMOR_SUFFIX
+
#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 0122747ba150c43da8564a41730524867d0d26b4..32c2cdaccd93966cd0fda561511fe90674e45022 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -278,6 +278,16 @@ static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE);
module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644);
#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE */
+/*
+ * Export sig_enforce kernel cmdline parameter to allow other subsystems rely
+ * on that instead of directly to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE config.
+ */
+bool is_module_sig_enforced(void)
+{
+ return sig_enforce;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced);
+
/* Block module loading/unloading? */
int modules_disabled = 0;
core_param(nomodule, modules_disabled, bint, 0);
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 06554c448dce886d3bd7a01a745a78ab5fd734e8..6f9e4ce568cd87fd8b529a2e8c08c615c6f790a5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -112,21 +112,25 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
{
key_ref_t key;
- char *data;
+ void *data;
+ loff_t size;
int rc;
if (!keyring[id])
return -EINVAL;
- rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data);
- if (rc < 0)
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0,
+ READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
+ }
key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1),
"asymmetric",
NULL,
data,
- rc,
+ size,
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
@@ -139,6 +143,6 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path);
key_ref_put(key);
}
- kfree(data);
+ vfree(data);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index f5f12727771a0aba01442d7c242f95464658abce..241aca315b0c351d6897e4e6d9ee2261cbbb3bcb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
#define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001
#define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002
+#define EVM_SETUP 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */
+
+#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP)
extern int evm_initialized;
extern char *evm_hmac;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 1d32cd20009a3bd35cf77bc11027354c00eb8812..bcd64baf87881b4194cf9852c0167900d96ddddc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) {
- pr_err("HMAC key is not set\n");
+ pr_err_once("HMAC key is not set\n");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
}
tfm = &hmac_tfm;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 063d38aef64e71a00763997752f93983fa9702d6..9826c02e2db8f789eea2dc9d209db7e605839de0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP,
#endif
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR,
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
XATTR_NAME_IMA,
#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index c8dccd54d5017da0de7a4f03708b5fabb49fe85e..319cf16d6603050f4ac6fef1f3e2aa31c7a941ce 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
if (*ppos != 0)
return 0;
- sprintf(temp, "%d", evm_initialized);
+ sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP));
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
return rc;
@@ -61,24 +61,29 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- char temp[80];
- int i;
+ int i, ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP))
return -EPERM;
- if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
- return -EFAULT;
+ ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i);
- temp[count] = '\0';
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
- if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1))
+ /* Reject invalid values */
+ if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- evm_init_key();
+ if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) {
+ ret = evm_init_key();
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+ /* Forbid further writes after the symmetric key is loaded */
+ i |= EVM_SETUP;
+ }
+
+ evm_initialized |= i;
return count;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 6fc888ca468e4f9cdd8938e535ebd4e2dbbe2044..c84e05866052a068e99b4f30236764e531c38896 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -199,55 +199,6 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
return ret;
}
-/*
- * integrity_read_file - read entire file content into the buffer
- *
- * This is function opens a file, allocates the buffer of required
- * size, read entire file content to the buffer and closes the file
- *
- * It is used only by init code.
- *
- */
-int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data)
-{
- struct file *file;
- loff_t size;
- char *buf;
- int rc = -EINVAL;
-
- if (!path || !*path)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(file)) {
- rc = PTR_ERR(file);
- pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
- return rc;
- }
-
- size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
- if (size <= 0)
- goto out;
-
- buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size);
- if (rc == size) {
- *data = buf;
- } else {
- kfree(buf);
- if (rc >= 0)
- rc = -EIO;
- }
-out:
- fput(file);
- return rc;
-}
-
/*
* integrity_load_keys - load integrity keys hook
*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c2edba8de35e4932a13e73ec55907f9987037dce..c7e8db0ea4c0e4bad275892f8c7b83c012ba8214 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -199,42 +199,59 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
int result = 0;
+ int length;
+ void *tmpbuf;
+ u64 i_version;
struct {
struct ima_digest_data hdr;
char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
} hash;
- if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
- u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
+ goto out;
- if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
- audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
- result = -EACCES;
- goto out;
- }
+ /*
+ * Dectecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems
+ * which do not support i_version, support is limited to an initial
+ * measurement/appraisal/audit.
+ */
+ i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+ hash.hdr.algo = algo;
- hash.hdr.algo = algo;
-
- result = (!buf) ? ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) :
- ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
- if (!result) {
- int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
- void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length,
- GFP_NOFS);
- if (tmpbuf) {
- iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
- memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
- iint->version = i_version;
- iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
- } else
- result = -ENOMEM;
- }
+ /* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
+ memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
+
+ if (buf)
+ result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
+ else
+ result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+
+ if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
+ tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!tmpbuf) {
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
+
+ iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
+ memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
+ iint->version = i_version;
+
+ /* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
+ if (!result)
+ iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
out:
- if (result)
+ if (result) {
+ if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+ audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
+
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
result, 0);
+ }
return result;
}
@@ -278,7 +295,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
}
result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr);
- if (!result || result == -EEXIST) {
+ if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) {
iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 809ba70fbbbfb3137339895db07301b39662d5a1..ec7dfa02c0519483818c40cce40ba0993fbd4712 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
*/
bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
{
- return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? 1 : 0;
+ return ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
}
/*
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
return -EINVAL;
ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
- (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0);
+ xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
result = 0;
}
return result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 802d5d20f36fe46ecb787163f4dafd532741c78b..a856d8c9c9f3af6601d211e5de36dde36b65b3b3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -441,6 +441,16 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
loff_t i_size;
int rc;
+ /*
+ * For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
+ * filesystems mounted with/without DAX option.
+ */
+ if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
+ hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+ hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index ad491c51e8339c8f497b218c7b007b7c12a98ce4..fa540c0469dac649ca7583834caacf7cc955b594 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ bool ima_canonical_fmt;
static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str)
{
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
- ima_canonical_fmt = 1;
+ ima_canonical_fmt = true;
#endif
return 1;
}
@@ -429,10 +429,10 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
}
ima_update_policy();
-#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
ima_policy = NULL;
-#else
+#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
#endif
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2aebb7984437f10afe6e9aaa964a42be88f9295a..770654694efcb4d728dd6a0f23b2f8f21d6e90be 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+ else
+ return 1;
goto out;
}
@@ -60,6 +62,8 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
break;
}
}
+ if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+ return 1;
out:
hash_setup_done = 1;
return 1;
@@ -235,11 +239,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
- if (rc != 0) {
- if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
- rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
+ if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
goto out_digsig;
- }
if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
@@ -247,12 +248,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr);
- if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+ if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))
rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+ if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
+ rc = 0;
out_digsig:
if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) &&
!(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
@@ -359,12 +362,12 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
*/
int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
+ bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
+
if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
-#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
- if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
+ if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
-#endif
return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
}
return 0;
@@ -406,6 +409,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */
return 0;
+ /* permit signed certs */
+ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
+ return 0;
+
if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */
if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
return -EACCES;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 95209a5f8595aff48c253d509eb4c93c6f674ce7..ee4613fa58403dd8842fa60399845293e24253df 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy)
ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
- ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
+ ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
- ima_use_secure_boot = 1;
+ ima_use_secure_boot = true;
}
return 1;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
{
- ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
+ ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index a53e7e4ab06c74d4ca4c85836f1e0d2e809433a6..e1bf040fb110959bcc53a2be840ffd32a31d8c3d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -120,8 +120,6 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
void *addr, unsigned long count);
-int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data);
-
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 1
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 2